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ABSTRACT: Global indicators of state’s performance have grown exponentially over the last three dec-
ades. Issues such as economic freedom, competitiveness, property rights, business environment, credit-
worthiness, democracy, governance, transparency and media freedom have become central topics of 
several global benchmarks focused on the evaluation of the state. The objective of this paper is to analyze 
the reasons behind this phenomenon, investigating the role of those global indicators in world politics 
and the shaping of an “ideal state”. In the first section, the study emphasizes that the global diffusion of 
rankings and ratings is primarily linked to the rise of neoliberalism. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s work 
on governmentality, global indicators are conceived as specific apparatuses of neoliberal rationality that 
help to conform states’ polities and policies to the twin neoliberal principles of competitiveness and en-
trepreneurship. The second section describes the often contradictory construction of the neoliberal com-
petition state. Then the study analyzes how the neoliberal state is forged by global indicators. Specifically, 
the paper focuses on the Global Competitiveness Index by the World Economic Forum. The article ends 
with some concluding remarks on the power of global indicators and some suggestion for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Global indicators and indexes of state’s performance have grown exponentially over 
the last three decades. International institutions (such as the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund), governmental and non-governmental organizations (such as 
USAID, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation), international private bodies (such 
as the World Economic Forum), and private actors (the “unholy trinity” of the credit-
rating agencies, Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s)1 produce annual indexes 
aimed at evaluating states’ behavior mainly in relation to three issue areas: business and 
economics, country risk, and democracy and governance (Cooley and Snyder, 2015). Is-
sues such as economic freedom, competitiveness, property rights, business environ-
ment, creditworthiness, public debt, democracy, governance, transparency and media 
freedom have become central topics of several global benchmarks focused on the eval-
uation of the state. What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? What is the role of 
those global indicators in world politics? And is it possible to delineate the features of 
the “ideal state” they intend to promote? The objective of this paper is to address these 
issues. In the first section, the study emphasizes that, despite the global diffusion of 
rankings and ratings has been caused by different reasons, it is primarily linked to the 
rise of neoliberalism. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s (2007 and 2008) work on govern-
mentality, here neoliberalism is conceived as a specific rationality of government that 
requires discourses, practices and apparatuses able to conduct human beings at a dis-
tance. Global indicators can be conceived as specific apparatuses of neoliberal rationality 
that help to conform states’ polities and policies to the twin neoliberal principles of com-
petitiveness and entrepreneurship (Dardot and Laval 2014). From the creation of a me-
dia and political environment that is conducive to competitiveness and free market, as 
the diffusion of some global indexes of competition does, to the more compelling ratings 
of creditworthiness, which could influence states’ policies and investor confidence: 
global indicators constantly monitor states’ performance and evaluate their conformity 
to the principles of the hegemonic paradigm. Unruly states are sanctioned by bad ratings 
and/or by their placement at the bottom of the rankings: as ‘losers’, they are driven to 
improve, while the ‘winners’ are presented as blueprints. 
As an additional premise, the paper assumes that, despite the crisis that began in 2008 
has called into question the effectiveness of neoliberal policies, neoliberal governmen-
tality remains the hegemonic political rationality which is able to inform subjects’ behav-
ior in accordance with neoliberal principles. In the context of this study, this means that 
 
1 As of 2015, they had about 93 per cent market share (ESMA 2015). 
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neoliberalism has made some values more relevant than others, thus emphasizing the 
need to assess, measure and monitor such values through specific neoliberal instru-
ments. Furthermore, it also means that these instruments, mirroring the hegemonic val-
ues, are often deemed as the most prominent and used for measuring specific topics. 
Finally, this means that, relying on their alleged neutrality and depoliticized nature, some 
global indicators act as pattern-setters which are able to impose specific understandings 
of the topics concerned. These indicators act as “technologies of performance” (Fougner 
2008, 318) that produce sedimentations of the normal on specific issues, which may in-
fluence the behavior of the evaluated subjects, as well as of other parties interested in 
the topic. As it will be specified later, this is the case of competitiveness and the Global 
Competitiveness Index by the World Economic Forum (WEF). 
Since the transformation of the state is one the main objectives of neoliberalism, “the 
quantitative and qualitative restructuring of nation-states, involving redrawing the 
boundary between civil society, market, and state” (Ward and England 2007, 12) is 
among the privileged processes that neoliberal instruments aim to evaluate. The (often 
contradictory) construction of the neoliberal competition state is addressed in the sec-
ond section, which describes it as a twin process of roll-back and roll-out neoliberaliza-
tion (Peck 2010), characterized by spatial and socio-political variegation (Moini 2015). 
The third section analyzes how the neoliberal state is forged by global indicators. Specif-
ically, the paper focuses on the GCI by the WEF. Drawing on their alleged political neu-
trality, indicators are capable of defining the contours of the ideal competition state and, 
although at different level of effectiveness, they can exert both direct and indirect pres-
sure to change on states: “effects are direct when an indicator is used to make a decision 
and indirect when they shape modes of thinking and analysis that provide the infor-
mation on which decisions are made” (Davis, Kingsbury and Merry, 2015, 21). The paper 
ends with some concluding remarks on the power of global indicators. 
 
 
2. The global diffusion of benchmarking and indicators 
 
As the seminal contributions to metrology by Desrosières (1998) and Porter (1995) 
pointed out, statistics and accounting are key features of the development of capitalist 
economies, modern societies and democratic politics. In fact, the use of numerical 
measures and quantitative knowledge was conceived as a more rational and efficient 
way for governing social life. As scholars on governmentality have emphasized (Ewald 
1990; Foucault 1991), the growth of the welfare state after the World War II was accom-
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panied by the concern with standardization and normalization of individuals by govern-
ments. The production of statistical indicators, which was largely in the hands of national 
governments, had both knowledge and governance effects: on the one hand, they 
helped decision-makers to get more accurate information on domestic population and 
produce more evidence-based decisions; on the other hand, statistics exerted a form of 
control over individuals, because through standardization and normalization it could af-
fect behavior at a distance.   
During the postwar era, another important contribution to the development of indi-
cators came from the advent of benchmarking in industrial sector. First emerged within 
the manufacturing context of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) as a technical tool 
narrowly focused on efforts to improve quality through comparison internal to compa-
nies and with internally set standards, benchmarking was conceived as a narrow busi-
ness technique framed through the language of quality and involving comparisons within 
companies to ensure the consistency of products (Larner and Le Heron 2004).  
By the early eighties, with the rapid diffusion of neoliberal policies based on privatiza-
tion, liberalization and downsizing government, the creation of indicators has migrated 
from the realm of the state to that of independent agents, such as corporations, civil 
society organizations, international organizations and NGOs (Rottenburg and Merry 
2015). As Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010) argue, from then on these subjects have 
constituted new authoritative actors who actively make rules, set agendas, classify phe-
nomena, evaluate outcomes, and implement rules and programs in global governance. 
From being the main indicators’ producer over the “golden age”, by the late eighties the 
state has become the preferred unit of evaluation of global indicators. Besides being a 
part of a broader trend within social and political life to develop tools for performance 
evaluation and assessment (Cooley 2015), this phenomenon is fully consistent with the 
neoliberal project of transforming state’s polity and policies, as well as with the neolib-
eral understanding of discretionary decision-making by politics and government as 
flawed and irrational. Assuming that individuals are rational economic actors seeking 
impartial, updated and comparable data to make rational choices, neoliberalism oper-
ates in the attempt to replace political judgement with economic evaluation (Davies 
2014), based on numbers and quantitative measures. Because of their declared commit-
ment to technicality, objectivity, rigour and impartiality, global indicators and bench-
marking are privileged substitutes for political choice in order to introduce market ra-
tionality and the neoliberal principles of competitiveness and entrepreneurship in state’s 
action. For this purpose, benchmarking assumes a new role and a new meaning. In fact, 
economic globalization and the liberalization of capital flows – both linked to the advent 
of neoliberal revolution – pushed companies for a revision of traditional benchmarking, 
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moving from a focus on internal comparison to an external frame of reference explicitly 
linked to concerns about competitiveness. Benchmarking was then conceived as a man-
agerial strategy to address global market uncertainties, which was “outward looking, 
aimed at improving performance by comparing across organisations, industries and na-
tion-states” (Larner and Le Heron 2004, 217-8, my italics). Specifically, it was understood 
as a calculative practice facilitating the actions of two categories of individuals, both be-
come prominent with the neoliberal turn: the international investor, to which bench-
marking provided more information to reduce the risk to her investments in the various 
countries of the world, and the consumer, whose new centring in the discourse of cus-
tomer satisfaction led to the application of benchmarking also to public sector organisa-
tions, such as government , education, and sanitary system.  
Taking advantage of the ICTs revolution and increasing computerization, which al-
lowed the development of more refined techniques to measure and compare the per-
formance of companies, since the late eighties there has been a proliferation of indica-
tors aiming at measuring and benchmarking states’ performance. In this new context, 
global benchmarking established itself as a distinct mode of transnational governance 
by non-state actors, representing “a new and distinctive application of authority in world 
politics” (Broome and Quirk, 2015, 816). As Foucault pointed out (2008), this new appli-
cation of authority is representative of the way in which power is exercised in modern 
societies, that is not so much on prohibitions or commands, but on more or less stable 
sedimentations of the normal, “which is produced and updated through normalizing 
forms of knowledge and techniques” (Triantafillou, 2007, 834), including benchmarking 
and global indicators. Global benchmarking operates as a normalizing governing tech-
nology, that is a set of “procedures and processes through which a norm is brought into 
play and informs the practices that it seeks to regulate” (Triantafillou 2004, 496). Nor-
malization does not necessary imply a standardization of conduct. Rather it can be re-
garded as an attempt to act on the actions of others, a stimulus to self-governance, 
whose strong point lies in the definition of the normal as a fixed (not static) “point for 
the ways in which a phenomenon is turned into an object of reflection, intervention or 
contestation” (Triantafillou 2007, 835). Global indicators regularly produce and update 
the normal for complex and contested values, such as democracy, free market, human 
rights, corruption, competitiveness and transparency. Moreover, by translating them 
into simplified numerical representations, they tend both to obscure the normative na-
ture of measurement and ignore the specificity of socio-political contexts.  
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3. Characteristics of the neoliberal competition state 
 
According to Ward and England (2007), neoliberalism can be conceived as a state 
form, since the transformation of the state is among the privileged objectives of neolib-
eralism. But in order to describe what characteristics the neoliberal state should have, 
what role it should play, and what policies it should implement, some theoretical prem-
ises are required. The first is to conceive of neoliberalism as a process rather than an 
end-state. In this way, it is possible to deal with the apparent contradiction between, on 
the one hand, policies aiming at dismantling welfare state and downsizing government, 
which seem to aspire to a less interventionist state, and, on the other hand, policies 
aiming at creating, promoting and protecting markets, which seem to aim for a central 
role of the state in neoliberalization. Conceiving of neoliberalism as a process also allows 
us to better understand its special feature, that is neoliberalism’s ability to adapt itself 
to different contexts, as well as to put states in a never-ending process of continuous 
adaptation and transformation.   
The second theoretical premise consists in considering neoliberalization as a twofold 
process, characterized both by spatial and socio-cultural variegation (Moini 2015). The 
first one is a roll-back process, consisting in restructuring projects “typically focused on 
dismantling alien institutions and disciplining potentially unruly (collective) subjects” 
(Peck 2010, 22). Based on the neoliberal understanding of state planning as inefficient 
and threatening individual freedom, this process emphasizes state’s ability to dismantle 
welfare institutions and hollowing out public companies and services. In this context, 
neoliberalization means lean state. Besides being predominant with the initial onset of 
neoliberalization and its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, by the late eighties 
this process is associated with a roll-out process, characterized by an “explosion of ‘mar-
ket conforming’ regulatory incursions” (Peck 2010, 23). Roll-out neoliberalization rests 
on the proactive role of the state in the creation, protection and promotion of markets, 
through the provision of a legal, regulatory, fiscal, and institutional framework consistent 
with market rationality. 
Given the neoliberal idiosyncrasy for government and politics, both these processes 
are better disciplined and regulated through depoliticized and allegedly objective forms 
of transnational authority. Besides traditional depoliticization, consisting in the reassign-
ment of government tasks to ‘non-political’ bodies, such as the European Central Bank, 
global indicators act as depoliticized measures both to increase the accountability, trans-
parency and external validation of government policies, and to limit or affect govern-
ment room for manoeuvre. As Dardot and Laval (2014) pointed out, state’s policies and 
polity have to be adapted to the principles of competitiveness and entrepreneurship. In 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 10(2) 2017: 472-491,  DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v10i2p472 
  
478 
 
fact, neoliberal globalization entraps the states in an international regime of competi-
tion, where every state must show to be reliable (and more reliable than other states) 
to financial markets for raising money through the sale of government bonds (Streeck 
2014). At the same time, globalization exhorts states to enter into the pursuit for com-
petitiveness: every state must be able (and more able than other states) to attract capital 
and investors, in order to respond effectively to the problem of job creation, that since 
the eighties has been entrusted to private sector, as claimed by the neoliberal dogma-
tism on supply-side economics and privatization (Gallino 2013). In this context, during 
the long transformation from the “Keynesian national welfare state” (Jessop 2002) to 
the Hayekian competition state, a key role in redefining the discourse on national com-
petitiveness problem has been played by the World Economic Forum, which promoted 
a new definition of “country competitiveness”, consistent with the conception of firms 
as ‘homeless’ transnational actors. According to the WEF, country competitiveness is the 
“extent to which a national environment is conducive or detrimental to the domestic 
and global competitiveness of enterprises operating in [that country]” (Rauschenbach 
1991, 202). National environments are judged in terms of their attractiveness and ag-
gressiveness, the former being understood with reference to the “quality of resources 
available in a country from the point of view of an entrepreneur” (Välikangas 1991, 8), 
and the latter with reference to “the competence of firms in transforming the available 
resources into value-added products and services” (Ibid.). 
It is important to stress here that neoliberal globalization did not force states to be-
have in particular ways, rather it encouraged them “to work on themselves to recreate 
themselves in very specific forms with particular capacities. […] Both people and places 
are encouraged to apply financial disciplines, demonstrate entrepreneurial capacities, 
and seek out new opportunities” (Larner and Walters 2004, 509). As Fougner (2008a, 
108) pointed out, “states have increasingly come to be subjected to a form of neoliberal 
governance” that “implies that there is a growing tendency for them to be constituted 
and acted upon as flexible and manipulable subjects with a rationality derived from ar-
ranged forms of entrepreneurial and competitive behavior”. 
As previous studies emphasized (Giannone 2016; Neave 2012), based on two carriers 
of change that act simultaneously for neoliberalizing state’s polity and policies, the state 
constitutes itself both as “evaluated state” and as “evaluative state”. On the one hand, 
global indicators and benchmarking act as transnational carriers of neoliberal govern-
ance, that systematically monitor and evaluate (thus rewarding and sanctioning) states, 
based on their performance with respect to some crucial neoliberal issues. On the other 
hand, in order to conform their behavior to the hegemonic values and possibly improve 
their ranking or rating, the states become evaluative states: through a myriad of agencies 
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and the diffusion of a culture of evaluation, they constantly monitor and assess public 
action and policies, as well as the conduct of individuals and organizations, based on 
quantifiable and allegedly objective measures. The evaluated state and the evaluative 
state are the two sides of the same coin. In fact, as neoliberalization pushes the states 
to regard themselves as enterprises both in their internal functioning and in their rela-
tionship to other countries (Dardot and Laval 2014), the states come to justify decisions, 
policies and rules in terms that are commensurable with the logic of the market (Davies 
2014): that is they shall show to be cost effective and market-friendly. In this context, 
the New Public Management (Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1993), with its under-
standing of public services as enterprises that could be run in a more business-like fash-
ion, and its purpose of transposing market performance indicators into non-economic 
domains, such as education, sanitary system, justice and public services, can be inter-
preted as one of the privileged way for the neoliberalization of the state.  
 
 
4. Shaping the competition state through indicators 
 
In a recent work, Cooley and Snyder (2015) collected a list of 95 prominent rankings 
and ratings having the state as the main unit of evaluation. Indexes are categorized ac-
cording to 7 issue areas: business and economics (n=17), country risk (sovereign and po-
litical) (n=11), democracy and governance (n=18), environment (n=4), media and press 
(n=5), security issue and conflict (n=9), social welfare (n=20).  
This collection shows that states are systematically monitored and evaluated by global 
indicators. Besides being based on different values and proposing alternative under-
standings of the state, all these indexes create competition between the states by rank-
ing or grading them. As Foucault (1999, 101) pointed out: “The distribution according to 
ranks or grade has a double role: it marks the gaps, hierarchizes qualities, skills and ap-
titudes; but it also punishes and rewards. […] Rank in itself serves as a reward or punish-
ment”. Rankings and ratings “steer behavior toward some desirable goal, and encourage 
[…] [the states] to stay on top of their commitments. There are incentives for compli-
ance, material or symbolic rewards for success, and sanctions for failure” (Fourcade and 
Healy 2013, 564). 
In the context of the present study, issues related to business and economics are of 
particular importance. In fact, by establishing the primacy of economics over politics 
(Berman 2009), neoliberalism pushed for the extension of market rationality to non-eco-
nomic domains and the replacement of political judgement with economic evaluation. 
Furthermore, as previous studies pointed out (Streeck 2014), neoliberal policies based 
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on the liberalization of capital movements and privatization of public companies have 
forced the states to compete against one another to attract capital and investments. The 
creation of the Hayekian competition state is a never-ending transformation that states 
engage in and whose success is evaluated through the transnational governance of indi-
cators. Hence, competitiveness is the keyword of neoliberalization: it is both a target for 
the states, that have to become competitive, and a modus agendi, as the states have to 
promote competition as a rule of conduct in all life domains. Among the indexes related 
to business and economics, the most prominent instrument for measuring states’ com-
petitiveness is the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), published annually since 2004 
together with the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), which was first elaborated by 
Klaus Schwab in 1979. The GCI is produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF), a Swiss 
nonprofit foundation which is best known for its annual meeting in Davos, that brings 
together some 2,500 top business leaders, political leaders, economists and journalists. 
The importance of the GCI is evidenced by the fact that it has become a point of refer-
ence for other indexes. For instance, the Index of Economic Freedom by the Fraser Insti-
tute takes most of its indicators for measuring states’ economic freedom from the GCI; 
Transparency International has been using the GCI data for the elaboration of its Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index and the Bribe Payers Index. Other institutions such as the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also refer to the GCI data in their publications, as 
do several academic publications. Furthermore, the GCI “has been used as an important 
tool by policymakers of many countries over the years”2 and the Global Competitiveness 
reports “have served as benchmarking tools for business leaders and policymakers to 
identify obstacles to improved competitiveness” (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2007, 3), and “as-
sisting [governments] in the design of better economic policies”3 and institutional re-
forms. Despite the many changes undergone by the instrument over the last three dec-
ades,4 the GCR keeps true to its original objectives of supporting business leaders in their 
investment decisions and, to this aim, introducing competitive pressure on national gov-
ernments through benchmarking. This pressure follows “from the reports’ overall com-
petitive framing of states, the normalising and visualised comparison among countries 
 
2 http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/methodology/#hide/fn-4 
3 http://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9781403949134 
4 Since 2014 the WEF has been working to modernize also the GCI, in light of the new reality brought about 
by the so called Fourth Industrial Revolution, “a convergence of technologies that is blurring the lines be-
tween the physical, digital, and biological in ways that promise to disrupt almost every industry in every 
country” (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2016, 51). The 2016-2017 report presented some preliminary results on the 
three most renovated pillars: education and skills, business dynamism, and innovation capacity. In the con-
text of the present study, we make reference to the stabilized version of the GCI.  
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found in the reports, and the competitive logic internal to the benchmarking” (Fougner 
2008, 319-320) that the WEF promotes and seeks to install in states. 
Taking it for granted that “governments are engaged in efforts to improve national 
competitiveness” (Fougner 2008, 317), the GCR ascribes the constitution and responsi-
bility of it to governments. In fact, despite emphasizing that they are private enterprises, 
and not countries, that compete in the global economy to create jobs and wealth, the 
WEF, alongside other organizations such as the World Bank, assigns national govern-
ments a crucial role in fostering efficient markets, by enacting market-supporting poli-
cies. Competitiveness is defined as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that de-
termine the level of productivity of a country” and is measured through a set of 110 
indicators, organized in twelve pillars, representing the key drivers of competitiveness 
according to the WEF.5 One third of the indicators comes from public available sources, 
such as the United Nations and the World Bank, while two thirds come from the Execu-
tive Opinion Survey, an instrument aimed at capturing the voice of the business commu-
nity around the world. According to its authors, the Survey aims to measure some critical 
concepts, such as appetite for entrepreneurship or the incidence of corruption, for which 
statistical data are unavailable or unreliable (Browne et al., 2016). Besides these meth-
odological justifications, it is necessary to emphasize that indicators can also be seen as 
“political spaces” (Urueña 2015) in at least two different meanings. In the first place, 
they are political spaces because “political judgements are implicit in the choice of what 
to measure, how to measure it, how often to measure it and how to present and inter-
pret the results” (Alonso and Starr 1987, 3); in the second place, indicators are “highly 
compressed summaries of information, meanings and values, […] [that], in selecting 
some categories of information over others, […] embody certain values about the kinds 
of information that ‘count’ in capturing the phenomenon being measured” (Kabeer 
1999, 2). Hence, it is (also) a political choice to base the GCI on business leaders opinion, 
with the 2016 edition of the Survey capturing the opinions of over 14,000 business ex-
ecutives in 141 countries. Their opinion influences the construction of the index to such 
an extent that “an economy not included in the Survey cannot be covered by [the] in-
dex”6. The GCI performs at least two functions: on the one hand, it mirrors what business 
leaders expect from the state; on the other hand, it creates an ‘air of competition’ be-
tween the states to improve their ranking. Although states remain formally free to ignore 
 
5 The pillars are: Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic Environment, Health and primary education, 
Higher education and training, Goods market efficiency, Labor market efficiency; Financial market develop-
ment, Technological readiness, Market size, Business sophistication, Innovation. 
6 http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/box-1-a-brief-history-of-the-exec-
utive-opinion-survey-and-the-global-competitiveness-report/ 
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this ranking, as well as business community opinion, they actually cannot do it. In fact, 
as the neoliberal revolution has forced the states to resort increasingly to public debt to 
support their activities, the sustainability of public finances is even more related to the 
opinion that those business leaders (as holders and buyers of government securities) 
express on the state, first of all in terms of interest rate on government bonds (Streeck 
2014). Hence, the more the state performs as business leaders expect from it, the more 
the state could possibly improve its position (and get a sustainable interest rate, or at-
tract foreign capital and investment).  
At this point, you must be wondering what policies and polity the GCI’s indicators7 
encourage the states to carry out. Analyzing the various indicators that make up the 
twelve pillars of the GCI, we selected the ones that mostly embody specific values and 
purpose a political understanding of state’s role and function. Specifically, in order to 
understand what kind of state the GCI endorses, we focused on indicators related to the 
main distinctive issues between alternative forms of state: the economic dimension, re-
lated to the level of state intervention in economy, as well as its power of redistribution 
of resources, for instance through taxation; the legal dimension, related to state’s posi-
tion with reference to companies’ rights and workers’ rights; the social dimension, re-
lated to state’s understanding of individuals, as well as state’s role in society.   
As to the economic dimension, the most of the indicators of the GCI focuses on the 
need to maintain sustainable public debt levels, a government balanced budget, as well 
as values of inflation between 0.5 and 2.9 percent: these are three basic principles of 
neoliberalism. The understanding of inflation as the main economic issue of modern 
economies, derived from monetarism, is coupled with the lack of attention paid to the 
problem of unemployment. While no indicator refers to unemployment as an obstacle 
to competitiveness, some indicators even seem to be irrespective of the possible impact 
of some policies on unemployment, such as the indicator that rewards states that en-
courage businesses to use the Internet for selling their goods and services to consumers. 
State’s ability to redistribute resources through taxation is highly penalized. In fact, 
state’s intervention through fiscal measures, such as subsidies and tax breaks, is consid-
ered as distortive of competition, and the index rewards states that lower both non-
labor tax rate (profit tax and other taxes) and taxes and mandatory contributions on 
labor paid by businesses. 
As to the legal dimension, according to the GCI, the state should protect property 
rights, including financial assets, and intellectual property. It should also protect business 
activities, based on reliable police services, which are able both to enforce law and order, 
 
7 For the sources and descriptions for all the indicators composing the Global Competitiveness Index see 
Schwab (2016), pp. 63-75.   
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and to reduce the costs that crime and terrorism impose on businesses. At the same 
time, the state should not be burdensome for companies and create an efficient legal 
framework that makes it easy for private businesses to challenge government actions 
and/or regulations. As far as workers’ rights are concerned, although the GCI provides 
an indicator aiming at measuring the level of protection of workers’ rights, which include 
internationally recognized core labor standards, however it does not take into account 
any element of firing regulations. Indeed, the pillar on labor market functioning actually 
brings out the neoliberal matrix of the GCI. Workers are taken into account in terms of 
costs incurred by businesses for “advance notice requirements, severance payments, 
and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker”. States should provide regu-
lation that allows “flexible hiring and firing of workers”, as well as wages set by individual 
companies rather than a centralized bargaining process. States should also favor not re-
strictive regulations related to the hiring of foreign workers.  
Consistently with the prescriptions of neoliberal globalization, the ideal state should 
strongly favor the free flow of capital and goods by reducing customs duty on imports of 
merchandise goods, and strongly limiting non-tariff barriers (such as health and product 
standards, technical and labeling requirements) in order to improve the ability of im-
ported goods to compete in the domestic market. At the same time, the openness of the 
service sector for five major services sectors (financial services, telecommunications, re-
tail distribution, transportation, professional services) and three modes of supply (cross-
border supply of services, supply of services through commercial presence, and tempo-
rary presence of natural persons) should be strongly implemented. 
The free flow of capital and goods is coupled with people’s willingness and ability to 
move for professional reasons. The latter pertains the social dimension of the state, as 
it regards state’s vision of people as citizens vs. consumers or entrepreneurs. Irrespective 
of people’s familiar and social relations, the mobility of people to other parts of the 
country for professional reasons is evaluated as a positive element for improving state’s 
competitiveness. Furthermore, consistent with the neoliberal precepts on entrepreneur-
ship and individual freedom, states are encouraged to increase people’s appetite for en-
trepreneurial risk, as well as companies embracing risky or disruptive business ideas. The 
old-fashioned social function of the state related to traditional social rights, such as 
health and education, is almost neglected by the GCI, which considers country competi-
tiveness as improved when the state takes care of reducing the costs on businesses of 
health-related absence by workers, as well as improving students’ skills needed by busi-
nesses.  
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Table 1 – A Selection of the GCI indicators 
Title Indicator description Sources 
Property rights In your country, to what extent are property 
rights, including financial assets, protected? [1 = 
not at all; 7 = to a great extent] 
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey 
Efficiency of legal 
framework in chal-
lenging regulations 
In your country, how easy is it for private busi-
nesses to challenge government actions and/or 
regulations through the legal system? [1 = ex-
tremely difficult; 7 = extremely easy] 
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey 
Government budget 
balance 
Average of general government budget balance 
over 10 years, calculated as the general govern-
ment revenue minus total expenditure, as a 
percentage of GDP.  
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Eco-
nomic Outlook 
Business cost of 
health-related ab-
sence 
In your country, to what extent does health-re-
lated absence cost on businesses (consider 
both communicable and non-communicable 
diseases)? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all]  
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey 
Distortive effect on 
competition of taxes 
and subsidies 
In your country, to what extent do fiscal 
measures (subsidies, tax breaks, etc.) distort 
competition? [1 = distort competition to a great 
extent; 7 = do not distort competition at all]  
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey 
Redundancy costs Cost (in weekly wages) of advance notice re-
quirements, severance payments, and penalties 
due when terminating a redundant worker.  
World Bank/International 
Finance Corporation; Do-
ing Business Database 
Hiring and firing prac-
tices 
In your country, to what extent do regulations 
allow flexible hiring and firing of workers? [1 = 
not at all; 7 = to a great extent]  
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey. 
Flexibility of wage de-
termination 
In your country, how are wages generally set? 
[1 = by a centralized bargaining process; 7 = by 
each individual company]  
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey. 
Attitudes toward en-
trepreneurial risk 
In your country, to what extent do people have 
an appetite for entrepreneurial risk? [1 = not at 
all; 7 = to a great extent]  
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey 
Source: Author’s reconstruction from Schwab (2016)  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The proliferation of global indicators aimed at measuring states’ performance can be 
traced back to the eighties of the last century. The expanding role of calculation and 
standardization as major strategies to manage uncertainty, especially in the new global 
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market where international investors were seeking comparable and impartial infor-
mation to reduce risk to their investments; then the demand, derived from the commod-
ification of social life, of measurement procedures to keep track of production, distribu-
tion, exchange, and consumption. Furthermore, the development and rapid diffusion of 
new information and communication technologies, that have made data easily recorda-
ble and available (Giannone 2015). These and other reasons can be ascribed to that pro-
liferation. The eighties also represented a turning point in the conception of the state, 
with emerging neoliberal ideas pushing for a restructuring of its role and functions. The 
fact that the Global Competitiveness Report was born in 1979 can hardly be considered 
a coincidence. Indeed, the neoliberal revolution was aimed at a radical transformation 
of the state, based on depoliticized and allegedly objectives instruments able to legiti-
mize that change. In particular, one of the main issues was to install in states the problem 
of competitiveness, by redefining it in terms of transnational firms’ capacity to compete, 
grow, and be profitable in the global marketplace. As suggested by the Foucauldian anal-
yses of neoliberalism – and particularly by their original interpretation of German 
Ordoliberalismus – (Foucault 2008; Dardot and Laval 2013), competitiveness, just like 
free markets, is not a natural condition, but it must be created through the proactive 
and decisive role of the state. Hence, from being internal to reflections on how to man-
age a firm, competitiveness has moved to reflections “on how to govern the state – that 
is, a problem of national competitiveness” (Fougner 2008, 309).  
The way competitiveness is defined and measured by global indicators can help eco-
nomic and political leaders to determine the normal against which public discourse and 
policies can be considered as legitimate and positive. As previously analyzed, although 
made up of several other indicators, the GCI embodies a specific vision of the competi-
tion state, which is consistent with the neoliberal ideology supported by the global eco-
nomic and political elites. Therefore, it is no surprise to find the same conception of 
competitiveness in many European Union’s policies and documents. Thus, during the last 
economic crisis, European institutions such as the Commission and the European Central 
Bank (ECB) have repeatedly criticized countries in economic difficulties by accusing them 
of lack of competitiveness. To illustrate this point further, we provide two examples.  
The first one relates to the confidential letter that, on 5 August 2011, the European 
Central Bank sent to the Italian government, asking for structural reforms in exchange 
for the Bank commitment to buy governments bonds on the open market.8 Consistently 
 
8 With a scoop, the letter was then published by the national newspaper Corriere della sera on 29 September 
2011. For a detailed analysis of the content of the letter cfr. Author 2015. A confidential letter was sent to 
the Spanish government too. The full texts of the two letters are available at: http://www.corriere.it/eco-
nomia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml; and 
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with the neoliberal dogma, the ECB asked for “key challenges […] to increase competi-
tion, particularly in services to improve the quality of public services and to design regu-
latory and fiscal systems better suited to support firms’ competitiveness and efficiency 
of the labour market”. Further reforms include the “full liberalisation of local public ser-
vices [...] through large scale privatizations, [...] a thorough review of the rules regulating 
the hiring and dismissal of employees”, a “further reform [of] the collective wage bar-
gaining system allowing firm-level agreements to tailor wages and working conditions to 
firms’ specific needs and increasing their relevance with respect to other layers of nego-
tiations”. As to public administration, the Italian government should “improve adminis-
trative efficiency and business friendliness”, also through the introduction of systematic 
“use of performance indicators [...] (especially in the health, education and judiciary sys-
tems)”. 
The second example is from “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece”, writ-
ten in 2010 by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the Euro-
pean Commission, which contains similar expressions. In fact, according to the Commis-
sion, the main objective for Greece is “to overcome its competitiveness problem” (Euro-
pean Commission 2010, 20). Hence, the medium-term reform programme objective is 
“to improve competitiveness”, through “reforms [that] are, in particular, needed to 
modernize the public sector, to render product and labour markets more efficient and 
flexible, and create a more open and accessible business environment for domestic and 
foreign investors, including a reduction of the state’s direct participation in domestic in-
dustries” (10). Drawing on business leaders’ point of view, the Commission noted that 
“the industrialists stressed that the hurdles to external competitiveness were […] in re-
lation to an unfriendly business environment, excessive red-tape and insufficiencies in 
the public institutions” (21). As to public administration, it “is overstaffed, characterized 
by complex, burdensome and lengthy administrative procedures, [and] does not provide 
legal certainty to businesses” (23). Other issues include “public policies, from education 
to R&D and innovation policies, [which] fail to provide an adequate support for the driv-
ers of productivity growth” (20). These examples provides further information on the 
EU’s conception of competitiveness, as well as the role that the European institutions 
ascribe to the state in fostering it. This vision is not just a part of the European policies, 
but is envisioned by the fundamental treaties of the EU, such as the treaty of Maastricht 
and the treaty of Lisbon, as well as the so-called “Fiscal Compact” treaty (Giannone 
2015a, Streeck 2014).  
 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/2011-08-05-letter-from-trichet-and-fernandez-ordonez-to-za-
pateroen.pdf. 
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Although, traditionally, indicators have been associated with scientific and technical 
assessment and their issues mainly discussed from a methodological point of view, an 
emerging literature on global benchmarks has emphasized the capacity of global indica-
tors to cloak normative agendas in languages of neutral and technocratic assessment 
(Broom and Quirk 2015). Furthermore, other studies have demonstrated that the pro-
duction and use of indicators has the potential to alter the forms, the exercise, and per-
haps even the distributions of power in certain spheres of global governance (Davis et 
al. 2012). The WEF, alongside other institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, act 
as producers of knowledge on competitiveness. The indicators they produce represent 
an assertion of power to create allegedly depoliticized knowledge which can be used by 
policy makers to justify and legitimize their decisions. Specifically, global indicators help 
to remove the political character of decision-making by transforming “le gouvernement 
par les lois” into “la gouvernance par les nombres” (Supiot 2015, 462). 
The knowledge power of indicators is coupled with a governmental power, as they are 
able to constitute states as flexible and manipulable subjects and act on their actions at 
a distance. States are conceived as competitors and entrepreneurs in the service of busi-
ness and private companies. Although states’ conduct remains formally free, each state 
is aware that a positive rating by global indicators could favor foreign investment, inter-
national aid, money loans, good diplomatic and trade relations, as well as the granting 
of financial assistance, and the purchase of government bonds in the financial markets. 
Hence, not only the states cannot avoid the judgement by international evaluators, but 
sometimes they actually pay to be rated, as in the case of the sovereign debt, with the 
states paying credit rating agencies, because the absence of their “seal of approval” may 
be interpreted negatively by financial markets (Lehmann 2004).  
The aim of the present study was to provide an initial (and mainly theoretical) frame-
work of the manifold aspects of global indicators in international politics. In particular, 
the study focused on the transformation of the state as a crucial case for explaining both 
the power of indicators and their connection with neoliberalism. It is clear that the 
power of global indicators is not always easily quantifiable. Further studies are needed 
to verify their presence in relevant policy documents, as well as their use by national and 
international political actors. Future research should also take into account the existence 
of potential conflicts between alternative indicators in at least two senses. The first is to 
identify indicators related to the same topic (for instance competitiveness), that define 
and measure it in different ways, and analyze the socio-political context that makes one 
preferable to the other. The second sense relates to the existence of indicators that em-
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body alternative values (for instance competitiveness vs. cooperation): in this case, re-
search should investigate the political and ideological reasons that make some values 
hegemonic compared to others. 
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